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Summary
A number of public policies – from the regional organisation of multilingual education to the development of multicultural activities, with 
consistent management of the various Community and regional powers in between – have a hard time fitting into Brussels’s current 
framework.  The matter of reforming this framework, whether slightly or radically, is thus regularly brought up.
Brussels Studies has chosen to ask the question of Brussels’s institutional future based on a widely circulated document that proposes 
some rather radical solutions, namely, the “Brussels Manifesto” (http://www.manifestobru.be).  Without delivering a “turnkey” institu-
tional model, its signatories advocate developing a federalism that relies heavily on the regions.  A colloquium on the subject was held 
last 19 March.  The proceedings of this colloquium form the backbone of this issue of Brussels Studies, which is published, as usually, 
in three languages.  In a new development, these articles are accompanied by some longer untranslated texts that were supplied by a 
few of the authors.  So, in this issue Alain Maskens, who is the president of the non-profit association Manifesto and co-author of the 
manifesto itself, engages in a dialogue with two constitutional lawyers:  Nicolas Lagasse (FUSL) and Jeroen Van Nieuwenhove (KUL).  
Hugues Dumont (FUSL – co-author of Issue 10 of Brussels Studies), who is likewise a constitutional lawyer, was given the task of 
drawing the conclusions of the debate.
Some very different visions of the region’s future meet each other in this dialogue.  Alain Maskens, as a promoter of the Brussels Mani-
festo, advocates an intensive form of regionalism that leaves the cultural communities with only the powers of the cultural promotion of 
their respective languages, excluding education, “personalisable” subject matters, and culture.  Secondly, he calls for a re-examination 
of Brussels’s boundaries or, failing that, clear progress towards the creation of an urban community (see moreover Issue 11 of Brussels 
Studies).  The manifesto’s signatories make a particularly original proposal in suggesting that the distinction between the borders of the 
federated entities and those of the linguistic regions truly be taken seriously.  If this were done, enlarging the Brussels-Capital Region 
would then not challenge the monolingual status of the municipalities that do not enjoy “linguistic easements”.  Thirdly, he brings up the 
region’s chronic under-financing and asks that the region be saved from otherwise unavoidable asphyxiation.  Finally, the Brussels 
Manifesto calls for the creation of bilingual electoral lists on the region’s territory.  To do this, it advocates putting an end to the candi-
dates’ identification by language.  Consequences would be both the possibility of creating bilingual lists and the elimination of the guar-
antees of parliamentary representation given to the Flemish residents of Brussels.
In focusing on the manifesto’s authors’ goals, i.e., promoting the organisation of bilingual and multicultural cultural activities, developing 
bilingual education, and waging an effective employment policy, Nicolas Lagasse asks to what extent the proposed solutions fit the bill.  
At the end of his review it seems to him that these goals would be served better by a reasonable evolution of the current structure than 
by the far-reaching reforms that the manifesto proposes.  In his view, these reforms would be difficult to put into effect.  Consequently, 
he advocates continuing to think in terms of advancing stepwise, building each time on the achievements of the previous step.  He 
even suggests strengthening the communities by removing from the Constitution the clause that limits their actions to the sphere of 
their own languages.  If the wish is to put an end to cultural compartmentalisation in Belgium, he says, everyone must be free to invest 
in bicultural activities.  He even proposes going back on the Saint Quentin agreements that transferred the French-speaking Commu-
nity’s powers to the French-speaking Community Commission (COCOF).  In his opinion, refederating the community powers and sim-
ply dismantling the COCOF would improve the coordination and consistency of the policies that are implemented.
Jeroen Van Nieuwenhove, for his part, reveals the vagueness of many of the manifesto’s proposals as well as the fact that many of 
them are unacceptable to Flemish political leaders because they either go against compromises for which they paid dearly or collide 
head-on with their notions of Belgium and the relations amongst the federated entities that make up the country.  So, it appears im-
possible for him to envision changing the region’s boundaries to make them coincide with Brussels’s economic hinterland.  The history 
of the Flemings’ demands is notably that of their request that the same language rules should apply across the territory of each of the 
different federated entities and the idea of dissociating regional territory from linguistic territory would not, in Van Nieuwenhove’s view, 
be likely to get the support of Flemish political circles.  In the same vein, ending the guaranteed representation for Brussels’s Flemish 
residents would, in his view, sever the tie with Flanders, a tie that is one of the last obstacles to separatism.
Finally, in drawing his conclusions, Hugues Dumont wonders about the enforceability of the manifesto’s ideas.  As he sees it, a series of 
fundamental proposals in the Brussels Manifesto appear difficult to carry out because they are incompatible with the French political 
class’s concern to conserve a strong tie between Brussels and Wallonia and are totally opposed to the Flemish leaders’ ideas.  How-
ever, that does not mean that one must be fatalistic.  And so, Dumont points to five reforms that he believes are possible:  doing away 
with the COCOM to the benefit of the Brussels Region, lifting the prohibition on the communities’ subsidising bi- or multicultural activi-
ties, transferring the power to legislate in bicultural subject matters of regional or local interest to the Brussels Region, giving this same 
region the power to organise bilingual education, and, finally, eliminating the COCOF as a federated political entity.
Alain Maskens
The Brussels Manifesto 
Some new thoughts
Translation: Gabrielle Leyden
I should like to start by thanking the initiators and organisers of this colloquium for 
meeting our hope to see "a democratic debate about the future of Brussels" de-
velop. They have also given me the opportunity to share some personal thoughts 
with you. In no way do these thoughts replace the text of the two Brussels Manifes-
tos (2003 1, 20072) that the reader is urged to consult on the Manifesto association's  
website3. I also urge the reader to consult two texts published on the Brussels Stud-
ies site in the wings of this colloquium, one on Brussels's public finances and the 
other analysing the proposals that former Prime Minister Guy Verhofstadt put for-
ward in January4. These notes clarify some of the technical aspects of the proposals  
made by the Manifesto association.
The second manifesto was drafted in the spring of 2007 to reiterate the consider-
able challenges facing Brussels and in respect of which its institutional division is a 
huge handicap. Although Brussels is the third richest region in Europe and a great 
source of jobs, it is hobbled by a disproportionately high unemployment rate and 
witnessing the development of a two-tiered society, with a split between rich and 
poor areas and elitist schools and underqualified populations and the gradual forma-
tion of ghettos. Squeezed inside a regional border that does not correspond to the 
actual boundaries of the Brussels area, the city is watching as its affluent residents 
and dynamic industries gradually move to its Flemish or Walloon outskirts, thereby 
depriving it of essential income for its redeployment. Indeed, 55% of the 650,000 
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A. MASKENS, N. LAGASSE, J. VAN NIEUWENHOVE and H. DUMONT,
” The institutional future of Brussels. Discussions based on the ‘Brussels Manifesto’”, Brussels Studies, 
Issue 19, 16 june 2008, www.brusselsstudies.be
Contacts : 
Alain Maskens, ipac797@skypro.be 
Michel Hubert (ed. in chief), 02/211 78 53 – 
0485/41 67 64 – hubert@fusl.ac.be
I.
Alain Maskens is a doctor by training.  He has worked as 
a clinical and research oncologist and created a Brussels-
based company specialised in the computerised process-
ing of medical files.  He is currently a consultant in medical 
computer applications.  As a citizen concerned by the rise 
of nationalisms hinged on identity he has written a number 
of essays and articles on the subject in the Belgian and 
Brussels contexts.  He is a co-author of the Brussels 
Manifesto and member of the Manifesto association set 
up to promote "a democractic debate about the future of 
Brussels".
jobs that it offers are filled by residents of the neighbouring regions, who take advan-
tage of its infrastructure (roads, hospitals, etc.), but pay their income taxes in their 
regions of residence.
Solving each of these challenges calls for an integrated strategy and strong political 
will. This is impossible in a Region where, depending on the subject, matters come 
under the jurisdiction of the federal government, regional government, Flemish and/
or French-speaking Communities, COCOF (Commission of the French-speaking 
Community), VGC (Commission of the Flemish-speaking Community), COCOM 
(Joint Community Commission), and 19 municipal governments (or boroughs), and 
where political formations, like the regional border, are still organised on the basis of 
the country’s linguistic split.
The collective failure of our current institutions and policies are especially clear when 
it comes to the city’s problems of education and training, and thus unemployment. 
According to the last PISA survey (the survey was launched in 2006 and its findings 
published in 2008), the French-speaking Community is at the bottom of the OECD’s 
scholastic league tables:
What is more, a recent study by Alter-Educ5 of the situation in the French-speaking 
Community of Belgium shows that the problems are more serious, on all fronts, in 
Brussels than in Wallonia, with higher grade repeat and drop-out rates in particular. 
Along with the mediocre mastery of French ascertained by the OECD, Brussels’s 
young people are poorly trained in Dutch, although the great majority of jobs in 
Brussels require knowledge of Dutch. Thirty-five percent of Brussels’s young adults 
(under 25 years of age) are on unemployment. Given the very great inequalities be-
tween neighbourhoods, more than 60% of the young people in some neighbour-
hoods are unemployed.
Correcting this situation requires investing and working concertedly on the services 
offered to first-generation immigrants, the rehabilitation of underprivileged neigh-
bourhoods, mobility, basic education, sport and socio-cultural activities, vocational 
Brussels Studies
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French speaking 
Community OECD average Flemish Community
PISA score: Maths 490 498 543
PISA score: Reading skills 473 492 499
Proportion of 15 years old pupils 
with an educational lag 44% - 23%
Table 1: PISA 2006 survey
training, and job placement policies. However, this is made impossible by the fact 
that the various powers necessary to achieve this are scattered amongst so many 
authorities, including some that are outside the region and thus pursuing inevitably 
divergent policies. Yet such coordination is exactly what the second Manifesto pro-
poses:
“Without contesting the Linguistic Communities’ rights to support specific education  
in Brussels, we propose that the Brussels Region should have the powers and sub-
stantial financial means that will enable it to support, coordinate, even organise on 
its own education that is well tailored to the training and integration of children and 
young people of all origins, on the one hand, and dynamic language teaching on the 
other hand. Moreover, this should be done in coordination with vocational training 
and its employment, mobility, and urban renewal policies for its underprivileged 
neighbourhoods.”
The second manifesto also issued a pressing reminder, on the eve of foreseeable 
clashes between the linguistic communities – clashes that proved even more sorry, 
mediocre, and drawn-out than we had feared – that many Brussels dwellers did not 
identify with the current institutional model inherited from the linguistic conflicts of 
the past century and everything had to be done to ensure that the night-time com-
promises to come would not reinforce this model.
In actual fact, the majority of Brussels dwellers, regardless of their linguistic affilia-
tions, want to shake off these linguistic blinkers. More than 50% of the people in 
each language group are in favour of bilingual or even more widely representative 
political parties in Brussels (Table 2). From 69 to 75% of them, depending on the 
language group, want bilingual primary education (Table 3). Only 2 and 7% see their 
future as being affiliated with Flanders and Wallonia, respectively6. Finally, belonging 
to a language community is the first feeling of identity for only a very small percent-
age of Brussels residents, coming well behind identifying with Belgium, the Region, 
and, for the French-speakers surveyed, Europe (Table 4). These figures challenge 
the theses of those who would like to create a French-speaking or a Flemish “na-
Brussels Studies
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French list 13.7 46.9 29.0 37.6 33.3
Dutch list 35.1 2.0 9.4 1.7 1.3
Bilingual list + List representing all 
groups 51.2 51.1 61.6 60.8 65.4
Table 2: Preferences regarding electoral lists (by language group)
Source  : Rudi Janssens : Van Brussel Gesproken. Taalgebruik, taalverschuivingen et taalidentiteit in het Brussels Hooofdstedelijk 
Gewest (Taalbarometer II) : Busselse Thema’s 15, VUB press, 2007, p 141.
tion” that would include Brussels. On the contrary, they suggest that regional affilia-
tion is the basis of citizenship and could thus be a legitimate foundation on which 
policies in Brussels could be built. 
In this context, besides the handicap of the fragmentation of powers to deal with the 
problems of education and unemployment, it is particularly difficult to accept that 
bilingual education should remain a marginal offering or that cultural or sports pro-
jects in Brussels must necessarily belong to one or the other linguistic community to 
get funding, all the more so as these activities often are not linked to one or the 
other language (e.g., music, the visual arts, and sports) or indeed are multicultural or 
multilingual. Consequently, the second Brussels Manifesto proposes the following:
“Culture and education are one of the most powerful levers in the building of a Re-
gion. Flanders, which has placed the Community and regional powers under a sin-
gle authority, has understood this. Brussels and Wallonia must each benefit from the 
same advantage. Brussels as a Region must have the powers and means to enable 
it to control its cultural and education policies. This will allow the Region to provide 
strong support for multicultural and multilingual projects in particular.”
Of course, one might con-
sider improving the coordi-
nation of the various bod-
ies that already exist, even 
dynamising the existing 
“two-Community” instru-
ments, such as COCOM, 
for the promotion of inter-
cultural activities. Despite 
Brussels’s civil society’s 
efforts, there is reason to 
doubt that such a devel-
opment will occur. Can we 
indeed reasonably hope 
that political forces and an 
electoral system organised 
wholly on the basis of be-
Brussels Studies
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Current system 40,8 28,2 23,7 32,6 36,7
Multilingual teaching 59,2 71,4 75,4 65,9 62,3
A single language - 0,4 0,9 1,4 1,1
Table 3: Preferences regarding language of primary education (by language group)
Source : Rudi Janssens : op.cit., p 82
Dutch speakers French speakers
1st choice Percentage 1st choice Percentage
Belgian 38.2 Belgian 45.8
Brussels 24.3 Brussels 21.5
Flemish 16.8 European 13.4
European 9.2 French-speaking 8.2
Municipality 5.8 International 3.6
Table 4: Preferences regarding “feeling of belonging”
Source : Rudi Janssens : op.cit., pp 132-133.
longing to one language will seriously promote common projects beyond the lan-
guage divide? Can we believe that French-speaking parties that are dominated nu-
merically by politicians from Wallonia who are promoting a French-speaking front or 
nation and Dutch-speaking parties supported 98% by voters from Flanders will in-
clude on their electoral lists in Brussels bilingual candidates wishing to promote 
bicultural and bi-educational sectors?
That is why, in the wake of the first manifesto and Brussels Residents’ Appeal7, the 
second manifesto called yet again for a revamping of regional political structures as 
follows:
“In the overwhelming majority of Federal States, parties are organised on a regional 
(thus territorial) basis and federated at the national level. For known historical rea-
sons, the parties in Belgium are organised on the basis of language. What is more, 
they are not federated on the national level. Finally, the voting districts separate the 
citizens on a primarily linguistic basis. Such a construction is not representative of 
reality in Brussels and does not correspond to the people’s demands. This Second 
Manifesto urges the political forces of Brussels to organise themselves once again 
without reference to language distinctions. We propose that appropriate electoral 
mechanisms should henceforward make it possible to take account of bilingual re-
gional parties in Brussels for regional and federal elections.”
In this context, we may wonder at the proposals that Nicolas Lagasse broached at 
this colloquium, that is, to confirm and legalise each of the two language communi-
ties’ role in promoting bicultural events! This desire to reinforce the Communities’ 
weight is based on a singular conception of Brussels society, to wit: The historical 
presence of Dutch and French in Brussels allegedly reflects the existence of two 
culturally different societies to the point where they must have their own political 
structures to govern separate networks in education, the arts, health care, etc., and 
also to the point where the existence of linguistically neutral or multiple political 
structures and networks must be refused. I think that such a vision corresponds 
neither to historical reality nor to current reality, nor even to Brussels society’s plans. 
Worse, it strengthens the position of those who would like to implement the princi-
ple of sub-nationalities in Brussels.
Whilst it is clear that language is an important vector of culture, it is not the only one. 
The culture that unites citizens around a common plan of life obviously goes well 
beyond the sphere of language only. What is more, a “culture”, a society can ex-
press itself or function in several languages, just as several “cultures” or societies 
can use the same language. Should we not prefer Jorge Semprun’s position – “En 
fin de compte, ma patrie n’est pas la langue... ma patrie c’est le langage8” – to a 
concept of nationalism based on language?
Consequently, the manifesto states quite clearly:
“It is not a matter of preventing a rich Flemish or French-speaking – or even a 
German-speaking – cultural presence in Brussels. However, this must not be done 
to the detriment of the possibility of building the Region’s own cultural edifice.”
Brussels Studies
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In fact, the Brussels Manifesto does not call for the end of the Communities. Never-
theless, in proposing to return such tools of development and internal solidarity as 
culture, education, and “personalisable” matters to the Regions, it creates the pros-
pect of Communities that are streamlined but refocused on their true dimension, 
namely, the cultural promotion of a language to benefit everyone. 
Similarly, the transfer of community powers to the Regions does not at all jeopardise 
measures in favour of the use of Dutch in Brussels. The latter derive from the defini-
tion of the country’s linguistic territories and laws on language use, that is to say, the 
federal government, which guarantees these provisions. The Manifesto does not 
challenge these principles. If Cultural Community powers are transferred to the Re-
gion new protective measures will nevertheless have to be instated, for example, a 
sufficient quota of purely Dutch or purely French-speaking schools will have to be 
guaranteed in Brussels if such schools appear necessary for the people concerned. 
Ultimately, such a model would do no more than use three basic instruments of 
Belgian federalism already foreseen by our Constitution9, but restored to their right 
places to be able to use them to best advantage. These are:
the Region, that is, the basic territorial entity of the country’s administrative and po-
litical organisation and the place that takes in and allow all the people who reside on 
its territory to participate as citizens;
the linguistic territory and language laws, which are overseen by the federal level 
and serve as tools to protect the country’s three official languages from internal 
competition and external pressure; and
the Cultural Community, which is a tool for promoting our national languages and an 
interpersonal link between all those who claim to belong to one or the other lan-
guage group.
To my mind, these are the foundations on which it would be fair and useful to rethink 
Brussels’s institutions.
Brussels Studies
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9 Belgian Constitution: 
Art. 2 Belgium comprises three communities: the French-speaking Community, Flemish Com-
munity, and German-speaking Community.
Art. 3 Belgium comprises three regions: the Walloon Region, Flemish Region, and Brussels 
Region.
Art. 4 Belgium comprises four linguistic regions: the French-language region, Dutch-language 
Region, bilingual Brussels-Capital Region, and German-language Region. Each municipality in 
the Kingdom belongs to one of these linguistic regions.
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Nicolas Lagasse
What future for Brussels’s institutions? 10
Translation: Gabrielle Leyden
Introduction
The Brussels Manifesto has three objectives: the promotion of bicultural and multi-
cultural activities centred on the region, education more open to multilingualism, and 
a more effective employment policy. Astonishingly, it proposes no institutional model. 
It limits itself to advocating the simplification of Brussels’s institutions and develop-
ment of a federalism that focuses more on the Regions than on the Communities. 
However, a model that could simplify the institutions does exist. It is based on the 
existence of three Regions and three Communities and proposes linking the advan-
tages of these different types of institution. This model should not be mistaken for a 
form of pre-existing institutional status quo, provided that institutions within the 
French-speaking area are totally overhauled in order to put an end to the fragmenta-
tion of decision-making centres so that the Walloons and French-speaking residents 
of Brussels manage the French-speaking Community together.
To what extent would the two proposals meet the three objectives set by the Brus-
sels Manifesto? More specifically, how would Brussels’s institutions be organised 
and what institutional links would unite Brussels dwellers to the Walloon and 
Flemings (of Flanders) if the manifesto’s proposals were implemented? These are 
the subjects of Sections I and II below.
I. How would Brussels’s institutions be organised?
The Brussels Manifesto advocates highly regionalised Community powers. Now, 
these powers have already been partly regionalised in the Brussels Region, for the 
Joint Community Commission or COCOM (also known as the CCC) manages the 
bi-Community matters that are circumscribed within local interests. COCOM’s crea-
tion was politically possible only to the extent that the special law on Brussels insti-
tutions rendered a certain number of guarantees for the Flemish minority “immuta-
ble”.
Brussels Studies
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II.
Nicolas Lagasse is assistant at Centre Interdisciplinaire 
de Recherche en droit Constitutionnel (Interdisciplinary 
Research Centre on Constitutional Law) (CIRC) of Facultés 
Universitaires Saint-Louis (Brussels); guest professor at 
Haute Ecole Paul-Henri Spaak (Brussels); and the author 
of several studies of Brussels. He recently published (with 
Xavier Delgrange and Jeroen Van Nieuwenhove): "De 
hervorming van de instellingen en de herzieningsverklaring 
van 2007. Een grondwettelijke verkenning van enkele 
voorstellen", CDPK, in press.
Contacts : 
Nicolas Lagasse, nicolaslagasse@yahoo.fr
Michel Hubert (ed. in chief), 02/211 78 53 – 
0485/41 67 64 – hubert@fusl.ac.be
So, the bilingual Brussels Region already has a series of mechanisms to support the 
cultural activities that unite its residents, i.e., the equivalent of a Brussels Ministry of 
Culture. Similarly, the institutional tools for creating bilingual education in Brussels 
also exist. After a score of years in existence, however, we must acknowledge that 
COCOM often falls short of the mark when it comes to wielding its powers. The 
Communities tend much more to be vectors of policies of a bi- or multicultural na-
ture: In exercising their powers, they develop jointly (cofinancing of events, etc.) or 
separately (organising and financing an athletics centre, etc.) policies that are likely 
to concern people without regard for their cultural affiliations.
These failings on the part of COCOM appear to derive from the two linguistic and 
cultural communities’ lack of trust in this form of institutional cooperation. Construc-
tive cooperation between the communities is contingent on institutional recognition 
of their respective differences. This is something that COCOM does not seem to 
provide, for the Flemish and French-speaking parties alike seem to fear that it will 
serve the interests and representation of the other community too advantageously.
There is no sign that this rationale, which prevailed during the creation of Brussels’s 
institutions, will be abandoned and such mistrust can be transcended. Whilst Brus-
sels policies that are common to the two language communities can be waged 
when it comes to strictly regional matters, provided that the minority is given special 
guarantees, this is more difficult in areas of jurisdiction that participate more directly 
in the definition of the citizen’s personality and through which the people define 
themselves.
1.1. The regionalisation model
Under the Brussels Manifesto, the bulk of the Communities’ powers in Brussels 
would be transferred to an institution specific to Brussels’s residents, such as the 
Region. The fundamental difference with COCOM would lie in the fact that the Re-
gion’s institutions would be composed without reference to the French and Dutch 
language groups. Under this model, all the existing guarantees that the Flemish mi-
nority enjoys in both COCOM and the current regional institutions would be erased. 
The manifesto raises a number of questions about how the institutions would func-
tion, their natures and their compositions.
1. How could recognition of the minority’s or minorities’ differences be en-
sured and what protection would they enjoy?
Does a Brussels culture exist? If it does, what are its tangible elements? If it does 
not, are there several cultures in Brussels? Even if we reject the importance of giving 
a society a common cultural reference for its inhabitants, we cannot ignore the fact 
that the protection of minorities is an essential given that the Council of Europe im-
poses on its Member States. If the Flemish minority’s currently recognised guaran-
tees are abolished, how will this minority be protected? How will Flemish culture be 
able to express itself better than in the current institutional framework? If other mi-
norities exist, what are they and how will they be protected? In actual practice, three 
hypotheses must be avoided:
All references to the protection of a minority are ignored and the current guarantees 
are challenged. 
Brussels Studies
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If this tack were taken, our institutions would be violating the essential principles 
regarding the protection of minorities that are enshrined in European law and Brus-
sels’s institutions would work to the benefit of the majority alone. The result would 
be the reproduction, on the scale of Brussels, of the unitary Belgium of 1831, in 
which the dominant culture of the time was the main voice heard.
Beyond these purely legal considerations, might we not run the risk of promoting a 
retaliatory surge of demands for new guarantees such as the introduction of subna-
tionalities in Brussels that would be more like to divide than to unite Brussels’s resi-
dents?
Guarantees are reserved for the Flemish minority, along the lines of what currently 
exists within COCOM.
In such an eventuality, would not the Region suffer from the same evils as today’s 
COCOM? How would the regional institutions be able to exercise the Communities’ 
powers jointly without being plagued by the paralysing, lame compromises that 
characterised Belgium before its federalisation (waffle iron theory) and COCOM?
Guarantees are recognised for various minorities, to be defined.
In this case, do we not run the risk of having each ethnic group turn into an institu-
tionalised Community and withdraw behind the walls of its identity?
In all three cases, the regional institution would be in internal turmoil and decried on 
the outside and likely to be sacrificed on the altar of a subsequent institutional re-
form.
2. Why should the Region be the reference area for exercising Community 
powers?
If the territory is the unique link amongst citizens, why should the Brussels Region 
be the right level for exercising the bulk of Community powers? The region does not 
have its own history. Might not the municipalities (boroughs) that make it up exercise 
the bulk of these Community powers? What is more, a canal cuts through the mid-
dle of the region. Might not the emergence of two regions be more justified from a 
purely territorial standpoint?
1.2. The model that relies on the existence of three Regions and three Communities
Under this model, the French-speaking Community would be run jointly by the Wal-
loon Region and French-speakers of Brussels. This model has two advantages, as 
follows:
This model allows for the fact that, unlike most States and cities in the world, Brus-
sels has two cultures, and it allows them to co-exist peacefully and complementarily. 
Concretely, Brussels’s residents would manage regional affairs through joint institu-
tions, provided that guarantees were given to the Flemish minority. They would 
manage powers linked to language and culture (in the broad sense) separately, via 
the Communities.
Regardless of this richness compared with other cities, shall we regret that this 
model allows for two cultures only? Not so, in my opinion, for it will also make it 
possible to allow for the region’s multiculturality. It is indeed significant to point out, 
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for example, that “foreign communities” are widely represented in the organisations, 
political assemblies, and various governments. This attests to the very great cultural 
permeability that the institutional structures allow. Just as in other “multicultural” 
cities, Brussels dwellers do not all have the same mother tongue but the over-
whelming majority share the French and/or Dutch language and, beyond language, 
culture. Allowing for diversity comes all the easier when residents share common 
points of reference. We must distinguish clearly between the various possible ambi-
tions for Brussels: Is it a matter of giving the region the status of an international city 
or, on the contrary, implementing a project designed by its own residents? Lacking a 
common cultural approach, around what references would the people build their city 
(take the example of Babel)? 
As we saw previously, we cannot be certain that the regionalisation proposals will 
safeguard these achievements. Regionalising only those matters that can be linked 
to the person raises the same questions. This is compounded by the fact that it 
does not allow the synchronisation of decision-making centres and thus does not 
foster the necessary interactions between different jurisdictions.
On the contrary, the Communities’ roles could be expanded. The relevance of Para-
graph 2 of the Constitution’s Article 127 might be re-examined. Amongst other pro-
posals, why not endow the Communities with effective institutional tools likely to 
enable them to act, together or separately, to benefit institutions or events that do 
not come under either one’s sole jurisdiction? The exclusivity requirement enshrined 
in the Constitution would have to be abolished. This institutional change would 
make it possible to expand the current exchanges of teachers between French-
speaking and Flemish schools, for example.
Managing and financing the bicultural institutions would have to continue to come 
under the federal authorities’ jurisdiction, however, because of their federal and in-
ternational influences.
II.The Brussels population’s links with Wallonia and Flanders
The people of Brussels and their institutions have many interactions (social interac-
tions, economic interactions, etc.) with Wallonia and Flanders. How can these ties 
be preserved?
2.1. The regional model
This model asks three questions, as follows:
It is necessary to re-centre the places of decision-making, but Brussels’s economic 
development cannot be seen on the scale of the Region alone. Synergies must thus 
be forged between institutions so as to raise such initiatives to another level. How, 
then should this cooperation be organised? The limits of the conventional path (co-
operation agreements, etc.) were fully revealed following the Saint Quentin Agree-
ments (regionalising Community powers). The authors of the Brussels Manifesto 
advocate the same solution, but without explaining how to avoid its pitfalls. The 
other path, the institutional one (identical composition of decision-making bodies 
and/or reduction in the number of institutions) has already proven its merits in Flan-
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ders as well as on the French-speaking side when it was adopted (see the rap-
prochement of the French-speaking institutions in charge of international relations).
The Saint Quentin Agreements fragmented the French-speakers’ living space legally 
to the point where they were the source of aberrations and practical difficulties in the 
people’s daily lives. How can these pitfalls be avoided?
Why should the diversity of Brussels’s residents be put forward as an asset and the 
diversity between French-speakers and Flemings a source of further divisions?
2.2. The model that rests upon the existence of three Regions and three Communi-
ties
More and more voices are clamouring for an end to the Saint Quentin Agreements. 
The reunification of the subject matters under the French-speaking Community’s 
jurisdiction would be a first step towards better management. In a subsequent 
phase, the wielding of cultural community and regional powers would gain in unity 
and consistency if these powers were put under the control of a single government 
(one administration and one budget) and a single parliament, so that the Walloon 
Region and French-speakers of Brussels would run the French-speaking Commu-
nity together. This movement, which would include the disappearance of the 
French-speaking Cooperation Commission (COCOF), has several advantages:
It would simplify the country’s French-speaking and Brussels institutions.
The institutions would interact more and thus be more effective and efficient. Em-
ployment, education, vocational training, and other policies become more consis-
tent and effective when the regulations governing them cover the widest possible 
area.
The reform would allow synergisms and economies of scale (a single French-
speaking administration) likely to release monies to fund new policies, especially in 
Brussels.
The Community Commissions’ drawing rights in the regional budget would eventu-
ally disappear.
This reform could be accompanied by thinking about ways to grant the Communi-
ties true powers of taxation.
Conclusions
The Brussels Manifesto raises more questions than it answers. After twenty years of 
institutional reforms marked by failed attempts to regionalise Community powers 
(e.g., COCOM and Saint Quentin Agreements), it suggests stepping up this move-
ment without explaining how to avoid the pitfalls that justify the quasi-unanimous 
criticism of these experiences that is heard today. Yet not answering these questions 
beforehand would be detrimental for the people and survival of the Brussels Region.  
On the other hand, the possibility that the challenges singled out by the Manifesto 
could be met in the current institutional structure founded on the existence of Re-
gions and Communities cannot be ruled out.
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Jeroen Van Nieuwenhove
A few notes in the margin of 
the second Brussels Manifest and 
its vision on the Belgian federal model
Translation: AdK
Introduction
1. The initiators of the second Brussels Manifest want to encourage a discussion 
about the institutions of Brussels and about the question who should have which 
authority in Brussels. The propositions of the manifest will be discussed one by one 
in this contribution. 
Proposition 1: Equal treatment of Brussels Capital Region
2. Because Flemish people were more in favour of a community-based federalism, 
than of a region-based federalism, and because of their bad experiences with the 
conglomerate council elections (agglomeratieraadsverkiezingen) of 1970, the re-
gional institutions in Brussels were not set up until 1989, after the Flemish inhabi-
tants had been given a number of significant guarantees, as part of a broader com-
promise, to protect their demographic minority position. The compromise contained 
some restrictions for the institutions of Brussels as compared to those of the other 
regions, such as in relation to the statute of ordinances (art. 9 BWBI) and in relation 
to the so-called review of ordinances (art. 45 BWBI). Neither did Brussels Capital 
Region get constitutional autonomy in 1993 as opposed to the three “large” feder-
ated entities. The practical significance of these restrictions has to be put into per-
spective, though. However, the question may arise whether the mistrust with regard 
to the institutions of Brussels is still justified and whether a number of these restric-
tions compared to the other areas could not be abolished.
On the other hand, the institutions of Brussels also exercise the conglomerate pow-
ers and a number of provincial powers. Moreover, the Community Commissions 
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derived from those regional institutions exercise major powers of the Communities, 
which makes Brussels Capital Region rather a “super region” in certain perspectives  
than a region subordinated to the two other regions.
3. All this does not alter the fact that the Community level is an essential aspect of 
the federal state structure for the Flemish people, and that this will remain un-
changed in the future. The concept of the Community makes it possible to act with 
one single institution both in the bilingual area Brussels Capital and in the Flemish 
Region. Flemish people have paid a major political price for that link in 1970 and in 
1989. Flemish people wanted to pay that price because they feel the relation be-
tween Flemish people in Brussels and other Flemish people is veryimportant. The 
slogan “Flanders does not let go of Brussels” expresses a fundamental institutional 
policy option of the Flemish people. It is not an annexation slogan, but a fundamen-
tal and legitimate Flemish policy option.
The organisation of the institutions of Brussels is unique in that they are very much 
in line with the divergent views of the Dutch-speaking and French-speaking people 
on the federal state structure, in which the individuality of the regional institutions in 
Brussels can simultaneously be addressed. The institutions of Brussels are com-
patible with the community model which is mainly emphasised on the Flemish side, 
but also with the regional model which largely prevails on the French-speaking side 
(even though there is an ongoing discussion among the French-speaking people on 
that matter).
The call in the manifest to “leave a Belgium where two communities are on opposite 
sides behind for good” goes against this basic given. One can defend the singularity 
of the institutions of Brussels and propose that it be reinforced by proceeding to an 
entirely regional model, but one also needs to understand that this aim can, at least 
in structural terms, not be reconciled with the Flemish institutional policy options. 
Therefore, the demand to reduce or even stop the intervention of the Flemish Com-
munity in the bilingual area Brussels Capital is unrealistic. Anyhow, one can hardly 
blame Flemish people for not wanting to accept the regional state model and in the 
same breath propose to abolish the community state model.
4. It is not so clear what the manifest means by the same protection as the two 
other regions. It probably refers to the representation of Brussels Capital Region in 
the federal parliament. This representation may be feasible for the Chamber of 
Deputies by means of a separate electoral district, just like the German Community 
demands. For the Senate, a minimum representation already exists (article 67 § 2 
GW), as opposed to the two other regions. Of course that representation is not of 
the same nature as the representation offered to the communities by means of the 
Community senators. For the amendment of the special majority laws a majority is 
required in both language groups and no separate majority requirement exists for 
Brussels members of parliament. Both the representation in the Senate and the 
amendment of the special majority requirements would probably lead to a curtail-
ment of the Flemish impact on institutional decision-making. To a certain extent 
such a curtailment may be intrinsic to a (con)federal state structure, but when it 
leads to diminishing the demographic majority position of Flemish people to a mi-
nority position versus a French-speaking majority position, it is understandable that 
Flemish people find this idea difficult to agree with.
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Proposition 2: Authority and resources concerning education and employ-
ment
5. It is difficult to derive from the manifest whether the idea is to replace the existing 
community provisions by the proposed educational initiatives. That is probably not 
the case, but the development of regional educational initiatives supposes in any 
case an amendment of the articles 39 and 127 of the Constitution.
However, it is not very clear which educational project the authors of the manifest 
have in mind. An education which is structurally aimed at teaching the two lan-
guages is a very appealing thought, but the question is who will use this type of 
education in practice. There is a danger that mainly socially well-off groups of the 
population will use it, while the deprived segments of the population and immigrants 
will mainly continue to go to French Community schools. Therefore, we have to ask 
whether the development of additional bilingual regional education will lead to more 
opportunities in education and employment for these sections of the population. 
This cannot be achieved by an additional high-quality bilingual education circuit, but 
requires an improvement of the content-related quality of the existing schools in 
Brussels.
6. The question is also where the Brussels Capital Region is going to find the finan-
cial means to accomplish its substantial ambitions of bilingual education. Logically, 
resources of the Communities would have to be used, but it is rather doubtful that 
they will agree to that, unless maybe when they get their say in that bilingual educa-
tion, which would in fact not be an unreasonable demand after all.
7. A better cooperation between the two communities about the organisation of 
education is Brussels would undoubtedly be highly appreciated. The recent initia-
tives of a teacher exchange program are a first step, but further cooperation is im-
portant to anticipate specific problems in terms of language command and em-
ployment in the context of Brussels. By means of a more intense cooperation, the 
quality and bilingualism of the schools in Brussels can significantly be improved 
while not requiring a revision of the constitution.
Proposition 3: Authority on multicultural matters
8. As far as the exercise of the cultural authority by Brussels Capital Region is con-
cerned, the same legal and other objections can be raised as for the educational 
initiatives above.
In terms of content, the concept is even less clear than for bilingual education. What 
are multicultural initiatives? Does Brussels cultural identity even exist? There are 
undoubtedly cultural initiatives which go beyond one Community and therefore de-
serve an adequate reference framework and support. The question is, however, 
whether the two Communities are not doing enough and whether Brussels Capital 
Region could do better.
As for the first question, you can still be of the opinion that “Community-
transcending” cultural initiatives are rare and should be promoted more than the 
Communities are doing now. But whether the Brussels Capital Region, based on its 
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nature, can be viewed as a better governing body than the two Communities, is 
rather doubtful.
All the same, the cooperation between the communities can be improved in this 
sense and we may have to consider granting the Joint Community Commission 
("Gemeenschappelijke Gemeenschapscommissie") the bicultural competencies 
which are currently exercised by the federal government. This may give some dy-
namism to the development of “Community-transcending” initiatives, but in that 
case it also raises the question of funding. 
Proposition 4: Better funding
9. Just like the other federate entities, the Brussels Capital Region has a funding 
mechanism which is actually nothing more than a spruced-up endowment system. 
Besides a limited number of fiscal powers, financial resources are granted to the 
regions on the basis of portions of federal tax incomes.
The evolution of the state reform has also resulted in "buying off" further transfers of 
powers with substantial transfers of financial means from the federal government to 
the federated entities. After several “one shots”, “refinancing” and other creative 
cash flows, the net result is that Flanders enjoys a relative budgetary wealth and the 
federal government is doing worse and worse. This is disturbing, because the fed-
eral government is responsible for a healthy and just social security, among other 
things.
As far as the Brussels Capital Region is concerned, the analysis in the manifest is 
partially true. A major city has specific expenses and the criterion for collecting per-
sonal income tax combined with the principle of “just return” leads to results that are 
detrimental to the Brussels Capital Region. But these disadvantages have also been 
partially compensated by a number of mechanisms in the financing legislation which 
granted additional means to Brussels Capital Region (the bonus for appointing 
Flemish aldermen, the solidarity mechanism, the Beliris fund, the financing of the 
function as the capital, …). Besides the “huge expenses” of the international and 
capital city function, there are also significant benefits.
Furthermore, false arguments should not be used in this discussion: e.g. the con-
sumption of healthcare by patients from outside the Region is almost exclusively a 
concern of the federal government (hospital budget and healthcare insurance), the 
Common Community Commission (OCMW hospitals) and, to a lesser extent, of the 
communities. The Region does not bear any significant costs in this respect.
Proposition 5: Integration between Region and hinterland
10. The need for a more intense cooperation between the regions in the field of mo-
bility, town and country planning and the environment can only be affirmed. The 
Brussels Capital Region and its surrounding areas are one economic web that re-
quires a coordinated and consulted approach of policy initiatives between the re-
gions and the federal government.
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The extension of the regional boundaries does not seem to be an adequate meas-
ure in that respect. If one wants to achieve a proper integration between Brussels 
Capital Region and the so-called economic hinterland, the entire former province of 
Brabant would have to be included in Brussels Capital Region, because that is how 
far the economic hinterland of Brussels goes. Such an extension however, does not 
seem to be a very realistic line of thought, only more so because the idea of a better 
integration can also be achieved in a less drastic way.
Proposition 6: Bilingual regional parties
11. Electoral districts do not divide voters on the basis of their language. The lan-
guage division is the result of the language border, the division in linguistic areas and 
language groups and the territoriality principle. But the former unitary Belgian politi-
cal parties did not fall apart along a language line, simply because electoral districts, 
language borders or language groups were created at a certain moment. It is a 
more fundamental political process which has made Dutch-speakers and French-
speakers want to contend for the voter’s favour separately. That fundamental politi-
cal fact cannot be undone just like that.
In terms of the institutions of Brussels, the strict division in speakers of Dutch and 
speakers of French and the fixed distribution of seats is somewhat regrettable. This 
arrangement strongly emphasises the twofold aspect of the institutions of Brussels, 
while the political reality is much more complex. The deep distrust between Dutch-
speaking and French-speaking politicians will probably make it impossible to put an 
end to that system.
Proposition 7: A convention with politicians and with the social midfield
12.The mistrust (almost contempt) which is reflected in the manifest towards “some 
policy-makers” does not detract from the fact that no state reform has been ac-
complished in a convention yet. Every alternative is welcome to promote say and 
consultation in the development of institutional innovations, but a convention does 
not seem to be the most indicated manner to deal with “multiple and complex” 
problems, as the manifest itself puts it.
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Hugues Dumont
Summary and conclusions 
Translation: Gabrielle Leyden
The “Brussels Manifesto” of March 2007 and commentary by Alain Maskens at the 
colloquium of 19 March 2008 have put forward a host of extremely interesting and 
stimulating proposals. Given the limits allotted to me, I shall focus on five of them 
that are particularly important and the objections that Jeroen Van Nieuwenhove and/
or Nicolas Lagasse has raised to each one of them in turn.
1) First of all, the authors of the Brussels Manifesto have a dream that can be 
summed up quite simply as follows: If the Belgian institutional arrangement rested 
upon only the three Regions – the Flemish, Walloon, and Dutch Regions – instead of 
on the two main Flemish and French-speaking Communities, everything would be 
better, both for the people of Brussels and Belgian federalism as a whole. If we as-
sume that this is true, Jeroen Van Nieuwenhove’s reaction clearly echoes the tradi-
tional objection against which this dream bumps up on the Flemish side of the line. 
Setting up a federalism based exclusively on the three Regions, he said, would cut 
the link between the Flemings of the Flemish Region and the Flemings of Brussels, 
whereas this link has always been deemed vital by all of the country’s Flemings. 
Nicolas Lagasse also recalled this fundamental political given that has been so well 
known since 1970. If truth were told, it is the source of all the originality but also the 
complexity of Belgian federalism, that is to say, the superimposition of the commu-
nity and regional layers. 
The manifesto’s authors could nevertheless retort that the community level today is 
contested more and more from various sides and thus the community-region duality 
that typifies our federalism is not necessarily immutable. We can discern four signs 
of this growing contestation. 
The first one is marginal but worth drawing attention to: Some Flemish separatists 
seem to be ready to give up Brussels in order to facilitate the fulfilment of their own 
dream. The Flemish Community would then be able to fall back upon its single 
Flemish regional component and accelerate the process of its transition to state-
hood.
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The second sign is at the opposite end of the scale from this separatist minority: 
Some political figures representative of Brussels’s Flemish residents are willing to 
have a few subject matters currently managed by the Flemish Community shift to 
the regions and, consequently, the Brussels Region, even though the latter is domi-
nated by French-speakers. One major political event in this connection that 
strangely went unseen took place on 25 January 2008. It was the consensus that 
the Brussels government reached, beyond its French/Flemish dividing line, when it 
was given a hearing before the so-called “Octopus” group set up under the chair-
manship of the Prime Minister-designate Yves Leterme to prepare the next round of 
institutional reforms. At this hearing, the Brussels government asked for the region-
alisation of two Community powers11, namely, tourism and sports infrastructure. On 
the other hand, there was no consensus on asking for the regionalisation of voca-
tional training as well, but “some members of the Brussels Government” had the 
fact that they requested such a regionalisation as well written into the minutes. The 
situation was thus very far from one of challenging the Communities’ existence and 
powers to act in Brussels, but for the first time in many years official voices were 
heard from the Flemish benches supporting a request to reshape the country’s re-
gional and community powers.
The third sign is the ongoing debates within the Wallonia-Brussels Commission that 
have given the Walloon “regionalists” an opportunity to remind everyone that they 
have been calling for an end to the French-speaking Community and the transfer of 
its powers, especially its responsibilities for education and culture, to the Walloon 
Region since their 1983 “Manifesto for Walloon Culture”.
Finally, the fourth and last sign to date – the event occurred after the March 19th 
colloquium, but must not be skipped in this assessment – is the “biregional plea” 
that the Ministers and Regional Presidents Rudy Demotte and Charles Picqué deliv-
ered to the press on 17 April 2008 and was favourably received by the daily Le 
Soir12, giving us reason to believe that the French-speaking Socialist Party rallied to 
a regionalist preferential option, even though this option is still very ambiguous and 
in any case vague about the powers that it nevertheless intends to keep within the 
confines of the “revamped” French-speaking Community. 
These signs will surely be considered to be in favour of the regionalist thesis of the 
Brussels Manifesto and likely to fuel hopes that the Flemish plea of non-admissibility 
that Jeroen Van Nieuwenhove recalled will not be the last word in the matter. If we 
take a closer look, however, we are forced to acknowledge that they are not at all 
convergent. Even if they do not express themselves clearly on this point, it does 
indeed seem that the dream of the Brussels Manifesto’s initiators is to see the Brus-
sels Region occupy a third spot alongside its two neighbours. Unlike Ministers and 
Regional Presidents Demotte and Picqué, they are not pleading for a “Wallonia-
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Brussels Federation”, but for an autonomous Brussels Region that would hold its 
own against the Flemish and Walloon Regions. Unlike the Flemish members of the 
Brussels Executive who are most open to the regionalisation of some Community 
areas of jurisdiction such as tourism and sports infrastructure, Alain Maskens and 
his friends want to regionalise the greatest part of the subject matters under Com-
munity jurisdiction, starting with education. The Brussels Manifesto’s institutional 
options thus remain doubly marginal. They are marginal on the one hand because of 
the consensus of the French-speaking political leaders of Belgium who want to re-
main united – and want this unity today more than ever, given the coming summer’s 
political agenda – against Flemish demands, whether this unity be achieved via the 
French-speaking Community or a “Wallonia-Brussels Federation”. And they are 
marginal on the other hand because of the Flemish consensus in favour of maintain-
ing the Flemish Community’s power to act independently in Brussels in areas as 
strategic as education.
2) The Brussels Manifesto’s authors put forward a less unrealistic proposal regarding 
the Brussels Region’s territorial limits, at least if we look at the watered-down ver-
sion. The more adamant proposal aims to dissociate the boundary of the Brussels 
Region as a federated political entity13 on the one hand from the boundary of the 
bilingual Brussels-Capital Region as a linguistic region14 on the other hand. Informed 
of the Flemish fear of a French-speaking ripple effect that would threaten the Flem-
ish Region’s linguistic identity if the second border were shifted, Alain Maskens 
pleaded for renegotiating over the first border (i.e., the regional one) without touch-
ing the second border (i.e., the linguistic one). This idea is intellectually attractive. 
However, it is at loggerheads with the Flemish struggle that has never ceased to 
ensure that these two borders, which date back to 1980-89 and 1923-63, respec-
tively, coincide perfectly with each other, to the nearest metre. So, Jeroen van Nieu-
wenhove did not even take the trouble to envision the hypothesis. He simply re-
minded his audience that extending Brussels’s limits, understood implicitly as both a 
“Region” and a “linguistic region”, was an unrealistic avenue. 
There then remains the watered-down version of the proposal, around which a con-
sensus appears to be discernable this time around. This is the idea of an “urban 
community” based on a cooperation agreement amongst the three regions that 
would allow better functional integration between the Brussels Region’s territory and 
its Brabant periphery. We could only rejoice over this prospect, if the summer’s ne-
gotiations confirm its political practicability15. 
3) The Brussels Manifesto relays a third proposal made quite a while ago by 
economists who studied the Brussels Region’s public financing system, as follows: 
It is high time to correct what must indeed be called structural under-financing of the 
region. Unfortunately for the residents of Brussels, we were forced to ascertain dur-
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14 See Art. 4 of the Constitution and Art. 6 of the coordinated laws on language use in admin-
istrative affairs. 
15 The aforementioned document of the Brussels Government of 25 January 2008 shows that 
its members were split on this, with some calling for the region’s enlargement and others for 
setting up an Urban Community. 
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ing our debates that an expert in public affairs as informed as Jeroen Van Nieuwen-
hove was still not convinced of the reality of the phenomenon and, consequently, 
the urgent need to correct it. It seemed to him that further, more objective, studies 
were required to make a diagnosis. When you know the number and quality of the 
studies that already exist and the fact that the Flemish Ministers of the Brussels 
Government are on the same wavelength in this regard as their French-speaking 
colleagues16, you wonder to what kind of expertise we shall have to turn in order to 
overcome these strangely persistent doubts.
4) The Brussels Manifesto also looked at the legislation governing the election of 
members of the Brussels Regional Parliament. This legislation forces all candidates 
to choose a linguistic identity17. It consequently prevents the emergence of bilingual 
regional parties. When this constraint is examined at face value, it can effectively be 
deemed regrettable. It is all the more so in that the socio-linguistic surveys con-
ducted by our colleague at the Flemish-speaking Brussels Free University VUB Rudi 
Janssens show that a majority of Brussels dwellers would like to have bilingual elec-
toral lists. However, before condemning this rule, we must understand its legal ra-
tionality and historical and political justifications. It is actually closely linked to the 
scheme instated to protect the Flemish minority within Brussels’s regional institu-
tions.
To provide this protection, the Special Act of 12 January 1989 stipulated that all of 
Brussels’s MPs would be split up into French and Dutch linguistic groups. The Spe-
cial Act of 13 July 2001 even resorted to the notion of quotas to protect the Flemish 
minority, which, without this, oscillated between 9 and 11 MPs of the total of 75 in 
the Brussels Parliament. Since this Special Act of 2001, the Flemings of Brussels 
are guaranteed representation by 17 MPs of the total of 89 that make up the current 
regional parliament18. The concern – the legitimacy of which is difficult to contest – 
to balance the make-up of Brussels’s executive authority also results from this divi-
sion of Brussels’s residents into two linguistic categories19. 
The Flemish political parties are strongly attached to this scheme because they re-
member the election of the first Greater Brussels Council following the 1970 consti-
tutional revision that led to the appointment of councilpeople whom they disavowed 
as being “fake Flemings”. Jeroen Van Nieuwenhove clearly referred to this memory 
when he opined that prohibiting bilingual electoral lists might be regrettable but was 
probably the price to pay to defuse the mutual distrust that characterises relations 
between French-speaking and Flemish politicians.
The question is then whether it is possible to abandon the constraint that the Brus-
sels Manifesto criticises whilst giving the Flemish minority the protection to which it 
is entitled in the context of mistrust that the speakers recalled. We must admit that 
Brussels Studies
the e-journal for academic research on Brussels  20
16 See the aforementioned document of the Brussels Government, pp. 1-6 and 8. Structural 
refinancing of the federal scientific and cultural establishments that are overseen by the State 
and refinancing of the Community Commissions are also requested. We know how alarming 
the position of the French-speaking Community Commission in particular is. 
17 See indeed Art. 17 of the Special Act of 12 January 1989. 
18 See Art. 20(§2 of the Special Act of 12 January 1989. 
19 See Art. 34 and 41 of the Special Act of 12 January 1989. 
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the Brussels Manifesto remains silent on this point and Alain Maskens’s suggestions 
are problematic at the very least. Maskens effectively called for external guarantees 
that would require the federal government’s intervention. Now, is it not contradictory 
to plead for stepped up Brussels regional authority whilst replacing the existing 
guarantees that respect this autonomy with alternative guarantees that could only 
threaten it? In my opinion, the protection that is procured by the existence of the 
two separate linguistic groups should be maintained but accompanied by the free-
dom to submit bilingual electoral lists. It would be technically possible to combine 
these two options. 
5) The fifth and last proposal made by the Brussels Manifesto that I should like to 
pinpoint and comment upon more amply in these conclusions is without a doubt 
one of the most revealing of its signatories’ plans. It is the proposal advocating the 
transfer of the cultural, educational, and “personalisable” powers that are currently 
held by the French-speaking Community or French-speaking Community Commis-
sion (COCOF) of Brussels and the Flemish Community20 to the Brussels Region in 
order to have the latter coincide with a “Brussels Community”. Alain Maskens did 
not, however, take this thinking to its logical conclusion. Doubtless aware of the 
objection mentioned in my first conclusion and keen as well to respect the share of 
legitimacy that is kept by each of the monolingual Communities, which can act in 
the same territory to meet the expectations of their respective “subjects”, he did not 
recommend getting rid of the two major entities, the Flemish and French-speaking 
Communities, purely and simply. Instead, he wanted their powers to be reduced to 
managing cultural subject matters only, and even more specifically, those that are 
linked specifically to the French or Dutch language. 
This proposal is based for the most part on two justifications. The first one consists 
in underlining the close ties between subject matters that are currently categorised 
as regional and thus come under the jurisdiction of the Brussels Region, on the one 
hand, and the so-called “Community” powers that are exercised separately by the 
French-speaking Community or COCOF and the Flemish Community, on the other 
hand. Close links undeniably do exist, especially in Brussels, between education 
(which is entrusted to the two Communities), vocational training (a cultural subject 
matter entrusted to the Flemish Community and COCOF), receiving and integrating 
immigrants (a personalisable subject matter for which the Flemish Community and 
COCOF are responsible), and job placement for the unemployed (a regional subject 
matter). According to Alain Maskens, all of these subject matters should be concen-
trated in the same hand, i.e., the “regionalist hand”, which is the only one that can 
carry out a consistent political project beyond the language divide. I shall come back 
to this remark in a moment.
The second justification supporting this same recommendation stems from the exis-
tence of a bilingual Brussels culture founded ultimately on Brabant Province’s an-
cestral history. The Brussels Region should be able to make use of this by receiving 
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20 The Flemish Community Commission (VGC) does not have the power to make decrees in 
areas of Community jurisdiction. Only the COCOF has received this power, as the VGC did not 
wish to lose a portion of its powers, as the French-speaking Community did to the benefit of 
the Walloon Region and COCOF for the reasons enumerated in H. Dumont, "La dualité Com-
munauté française – Région wallonne : sens ou non-sens ?", in Administration publique, 1994, 
pp. 247ff. 
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the power to do so. Here Alain Maskens criticised the conception of things subtend-
ing the Belgian Constitution that links culture very closely to language. Nicolas La-
gasse, on the contrary, defends this conception. Where Alain Maskens sees a bilin-
gual Brussels culture that the Brussels institutional scheme allegedly overlooks, to 
its great error, Nicolas Lagasse sees a meeting space between two cultural com-
munities (in the strong sense of societal cultures discussed by the Canadian phi-
losopher of multiculturalism Will Kymlicka) that this same Brussels institutional 
scheme allegedly structures, to its great merit.
In my opinion, it is neither advisable nor possible to settle this controversy in one 
swift stroke. The links between culture and language are as undeniable as the pos-
sibility of anchoring elements of cultural identity to extralinguistic factors. What is 
important, in institutional terms, is being able to have the right instruments in Brus-
sels to meet the requests for support from both French-speaking and Flemish 
single-community institutions and truly bilingual two-community institutions. It would 
be vain to deny it. The political and cultural reality of Brussels includes balances of 
power and mistrust between an increasingly multicultural strong majority that uses 
French as its lingua franca and a Flemish minority that needs a padded network of 
schools, cultural centres, libraries, daycare centres, and other monolingual socio-
cultural institutions to withstand the Frenchifying wave. However, this reality should 
not discourage all those who wish to overcome the linguistic divide by means of 
truly bicultural initiatives, and that is where progress must be made. Nicolas Lagasse 
clearly mentioned the particularly narrow limits within which the two-community 
endeavours that the relevant institutions have effectively initiated in Brussels are 
working, i.e., bicultural and bi-educational legislation in the case of the State and 
bipersonalisable legislation and organising or subsidiary powers for all bicommunity 
subject matters other than language use in the case of the Joint Community Com-
mission (COCOM). The State and COCOM’s failings are manifest, and the linchpins 
of the Brussels Manifesto must be congratulated for having organised their public 
denunciation. Still, what can be done to correct them?
To tell the truth, I am not convinced by the path that Alain Maskens advocates when 
he says that a fair and democratic plan for society requires a single government 
authority to be in charge, in this case a regional one. In taking this tack, he is con-
necting up, to a certain extent, with the old nationalist fantasy of searching for con-
gruence between one territory, one culture, and one authority, although I am sure he 
has done so completely unconsciously. Now, we are doomed to a certain dose of 
complexity if we want to conserve a region in which the Flemish conserve the 
achievements that were included in the remarkable compromise of 1988-89 and the 
French-speakers remain united with the Walloons in some essential areas. Some 
simplification is obviously desirable and possible, notably through the transformation 
of a few community subject matters into regional ones, but a unilateral simplification 
that sacrifices most of the chains of solidarity between communities on the altar of 
regionalisation raised to the level of dogma is neither a realistic nor a promising ave-
nue to my mind.
On the other hand, we can follow the good reform suggestions that Nicolas La-
gasse defends to officialise and thus encourage the bi- and multicultural activities 
that each of the two communities (the French-speaking and Flemish Communities) 
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support de facto despite the constitutional prohibition of such action21. Let me add 
and stress that the Brussels Region should also be given powers in the bicultural 
and bi-educational subject matters of regional and local interest. This would enable 
it to step advantageously into the breach that the State has left, in practice, today22. 
Let us also abolish the Joint Community Commission and its paralysing system of 
joint oversight by ministers belonging to different linguistic groups in the area of bi-
personalisable subject matters and entrust the latter’s management to the Brussels 
Region’s bodies, as the Brussels Government itself has just proposed23. 
As for the rest, each of the cultural, educational, and personalisable subject matters 
entrusted to the French-speaking Community or transferred by the latter to the Wal-
loon Region and COCOF would have to be examined. A fairly objective review of the 
ways that these various subject matters have been managed up to now is the only 
way to draw a conclusion as to the opportuneness of keeping them at the level of 
power where they are currently housed, sending them back into the lap of the 
French-speaking Community, or rallying the Flemish partners to the idea of turning 
them into regional subject matters. I do not believe in the wisdom of a purely ideo-
logical approach that would decree that all these subject matters must be regional-
ised – that is the so-called “regionalist” point of view – or those that were transferred 
in 1993 must come under community jurisdiction once again – that is the so-called 
“communitarian” point of view defended in our debate by Nicolas Lagasse – or even 
that a whole bloc, such as all personalisable subject matters taken together, must 
be regionalised, whereas cultural and educational subject matters should remain 
under the jurisdiction of the French-speaking Community, if necessary rechristened 
“Wallonia-Brussels Authority” – that is the attempt at a compromise made by fellow 
constitutional lawyer Marc Uyttendaele. The “regionalists” and “communitarians” 
must engage in a serene dialogue not only within the Wallonia-Brussels Commission 
but with the Flemish residents of Brussels and Flanders as well, using arguments 
that allow for the singular aspects of each of the subject matters under considera-
tion, rather than being guided by prejudices. However, there is an imperative need 
for institutional simplification that has become indispensable, given the complexity of 
the current tangle of institutional strands. It does indeed seem that the best way to 
achieve this would be to abolish the COCOF as a federated political entity with 
powers to adopt decrees in the community subject matters that were transferred to 
the Walloon Region and COCOF in 1993. These subject matters could be either 
recommunitarised for the benefit of the French-speaking Community (but this pro-
posal would obviously require the Walloons’ consent) or regionalised so that the 
Brussels and Flemish Regions would become competent to settle them in their re-
spective jurisdictions (this, need it be said, would require the consent of the 
Flemings, whose Community would lose the power to manage such subject matters 
through decrees that are enforceable in the Flemish Region and Flemish institutions 
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of Brussels without distinction)24. The COCOF would then conserve only the powers 
of a decentralised entity accountable to the French-speaking Community, as has 
always been and continues to be the case of the Flemish Community Commission 
(VGC). 
Pending an in-depth case-by-case examination, for which we call with all our might, 
it thus is not possible to give here the complete list of community subject matters 
that could be regionalised or those currently entrusted to the COCOF that would 
benefit from being returned to the French-speaking Community. I shall thus limit my 
remarks to a few thoughts. Besides the regionalisation of tourism and sports infra-
structure that has already been demanded, and quite rightly so, by the Brussels 
government, let me simply point out that there would be, for example, some good 
reasons to argue, along with the Brussels Manifesto’s authors, in favour of regional-
ising occupational training (a cultural subject matter) as well as the reception and 
integration of immigrants (a personalisable subject matter). However, we cannot 
hide the loss of autonomy that such transfers would entail for the French-speakers 
and Flemish alike, who would then be forced to reach common understandings on 
these essential matters whereas they currently manage them completely independ-
ently. That does not mean that the possibility must be ruled out, but simply that all 
its implications must be weighed carefully before a decision is taken. Care must be 
taken not to get stuck in the paralysis that the logic of mutual veto powers would 
induce in the name of an apparent increase in efficiency and consistency.
When it comes to education, instituting a bilingual school system in Brussels would 
be a good idea in my view25. The Brussels Region could be given this power, pro-
vided that it wielded it in cooperation with the French-speaking and Flemish Com-
munities, which have built up considerable legitimacy and expertise in the area that 
it would be counterproductive to overlook. However, these same Communities must 
not be divested for all that of the right to organise and subsidise education built 
around their respective languages26. As for cultural areas, I have already said how 
desirable it would be to see authentically bicultural activities welcomed more gener-
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24 The Walloon Region, for its part, would then be responsible for these matters across its 
entire territory, whereas it currently has jurisdiction over them in the French-speaking region 
only by virtue of Article 138 of the Constitution. To maintain the status quo in this connection 
and not strip the German-speaking Community of its powers, the Walloon Region would have 
to transfer its powers in this matters regarding the German-speaking region to the German-
speaking Community, which it could do without problems by virtue of Article 139 of the Consti-
tution.
25 We shall not, however, be so naive as to consider this a magic wand that, with one wave, 
would correct all the – in many respects dramatic – flaws that plague the school system in 
Brussels. These flaws are explained by factors other than the current rules for splitting powers 
between the Communities and Regions.
26 Here I share the concern expressed by Jeroen Van Nieuwenhove, who does not want a 
network of bilingual schools in Brussels to lead to a drop in the quality of the city’s monolingual 
schools or financial divestment of the Communities in these schools. As for Nicolas Lagasse’s 
preference for using language immersion techniques more often, I could rally to it only in the 
event of the proven failure of the more ambitious idea of bilingual Brussels schools organised 
by a bilingual authority. However, realism forces me to recognise that this failure is probable, if it 
is not already an established outcome, given the hostility with which Flemish political circles 
have already reacted to the idea.
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ously in Brussels. This would require regionalising the bicultural sector of regional 
and local interest. Yet once again, this should in no way be done to the detriment of 
the French-speaking and Flemish Communities’ rights to support their respective 
cultures actively and, moreover, non-exclusively. 
Supposing that it is deemed acceptable by the Flemish side quod non, the pure and 
simple regionalisation of culture would strike a lethal blow to the Brussels-Walloon 
solidarity that is politically and economically vital for the future, whether this future 
unfolds within a Belgian federal framework or not. The “regionalists” invariably 
counter that it will be possible to maintain this solidarity through cooperation agree-
ments. However, this response is not satisfactory when one is aware of the fragility 
of this technique, for an agreement is reached and changed by a unanimous vote. It 
is thus vulnerable to the veto or, more simply, inertia of each of the contracting par-
ties. The experience of intra-francophone cooperative federalism since the 1993 
Saint Quentin agreements unfortunately proves this27, as Nicolas Lagasse reminded 
us. A united institution is much stronger than a juxtaposition of agreements. That 
makes all the difference between federalism and confederalism.
Let me conclude by gathering all of our suggestions together and taking a last 
glance at the Brussels Manifesto. Our suggestions: Subject to the contributions of 
the coming debates on the subject, it seemed recommendable to simplify and im-
prove both the legitimacy and the efficiency of the Brussels institutional arrangement 
and necessarily the Walloon and Flemish ones as well by the following five reforms. 
First, eliminating the COCOM and replacing it by the Brussels Region, which would 
then have the power to adopt ordinances in bipersonalisable subject matters28. 
Second, lifting the constitutional interdiction on the French-speaking and Flemish 
Communities’ subsidising bi- and multicultural activities in Brussels29. Third, trans-
ferring the power to legislate in bicultural subject matters of Brussels regional or 
local interest from the Federal State to the Brussels Region30. Fourth, giving the 
Brussels Region the power to create a network of bilingual schools in consultation 
with the two Communities 31. Fifth, eliminating the COCOF as a federated political 
entity with the power to issue decrees in the areas of Community jurisdiction that 
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27 See R. BORN, "Bilan de l'exercice des compétences transférées par la Communauté 
française", C.H. du CRISP, 2002, Issue 1783-1784. 
28 This reform entails the revision of Articles 39 and 135 of the Constitution and the Special Act 
of 12 January 1989 on Brussels’s institutions. 
29 This reform entails the revision of Article 127 of the Constitution. 
30 This reform also entails the revision of Articles 39 and 127 of the Constitution and the Spe-
cial Act of 12 January 1989. As a result, the financing of bicultural activities of regional or local 
interest in Brussels would become a concurrent jurisdiction in which each of the two Commu-
nities, as well as the Brussels Region, could act. A rule to settle legal conflicts would have to 
be foreseen. Let me specify that the Federal State, for its part, would keep the bicultural sector 
of national interest (such as the royal opera house and Brussels’s Fine Arts Centre), and federal 
scientific and cultural establishments, pursuant to an explicit clause that would have to be 
included for this purpose in the Constitution. Joint community governance of these subject 
matters, as recommended by the Flemish Parliament’s resolutions of 3 March 1999, would 
lead straight to blockages and immobility.
31 This reform entails the revision of Articles 39 and 127 of the Constitution and this same 
special law. 
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were transferred to the Walloon Region and itself in 1993. These subject matters 
would all be returned to the jurisdiction of the French-speaking Community or else 
regionalised32. 
Finally, let’s glance one last time at the Brussels Manifesto. At the end of our ex-
changes on March 19 I was struck by the following paradox: The Brussels Mani-
festo claims to be rooted in a bilingual Brussels culture that should hypothetically 
show itself to be particularly understanding of the Flemish point of view. However, it 
basically piles on proposals that are strongly opposed to this point of view, to wit: 
enlargement of the Brussels Region, elimination of monolingual electoral lists, elimi-
nation of the guarantees ensuring the existence of a Dutch language group in the 
Brussels Parliament, and elimination of the Flemish Community Commission despite 
the invaluable role that it is known to have played in filling the gap left by the Brus-
sels boroughs’ lack of zeal33. Moreover, the Brussels Manifesto is largely insensitive 
to the ties that unite the French-speakers of Brussels, who undeniably make up the 
majority of Brussels’s population, and Walloons.
I have taken the liberty here not only of summarising the positions that we heard in 
the course of the colloquium, but also of giving a more personal, albeit backed up 
by arguments, point of view that in the final analysis consists in straining the Brus-
sels Manifesto’s ideas through the filter of realism and institutional consistency of 
someone who believes that it is neither possible nor desirable to cut to the quick of 
the Community/Regional dilemma whilst being convinced that the status quo is not 
tenable, either. Some of the reforms proposed by the manifesto come out of this 
filtration intact, even strengthened. Others are suggested. Still others – a large num-
ber, it is true – come up against relatively strong objections. I have no doubt that 
they will in turn give rise to further reactions. We are clearly very lucky that this is the 
case. In the final analysis, each citizen and each group should ideally conduct this 
type of deeply democratic exercise. Large fractions of Belgium’s civil society have 
tended much too much to suffer the institutional reforms that have piled up over the 
past thirty-eight years. It is high time that they make them their own again.
The most embarrassing difficulty thwarting this salutary undertaking today lies in the 
existential crisis that is undermining the very Federal State. Must reforms that as-
sume the maintenance of this State be designed, or must they allow for the latter’s 
coming evaporation, if not dissolution? Whether they want it or not, French-
speakers and Flemish, those who, like Alain Maskens, refuse this linguistic split and 
those who accommodate or defend it, and Brussels dwellers and non-Brussels 
dwellers alike must constantly keep the two possible scenarios in mind. The other 
difficulty lies obviously in the great complexity of our institutional construction set, 
the achievements of which we cannot attempt to modify without first understanding 
their whys and wherefores. However, we have no choice: If, as is fair, we want to 
subject our institutions to the requirements of legitimacy, efficiency, and simplicity, 
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of the Constitution, revision of the special law on institutional reforms of 8 August 1980, and 
implementation of Article 139 of the Constitution to safeguard the German-speaking Commu-
nity’s powers. 
33 See E. WITTE, “Looking back on fifteen years of Flemish Community Commission Policy 
(1989-2004)”, in Brussels Studies, 17, 7 April 2008. 
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we shall have to wade in, take apart all the mechanisms, link the institutional ques-
tions to the economic, social, and cultural stakes riding on them, and listen to each 
other with respect. The thrilling debate that Brussels Studies organised on 19 March 
2008 around the ideas of the Brussels Manifesto has certainly made a remarkable 
contribution in this regard.
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